SUNDAY, DECEMBER 21, 2008 - VOL. CCLII NO. 140

Archive for the ‘Insurance’ Category

Pershing Square Q3 2008 Investor Letter

In Bill Ackman, Insurance, Security Analysis on November 15, 2008 at 11:44 pm

These are extraordinary times particularly for active participants in the capital markets.  While I do not normally choose to write about macro and regulatory events, I thought it would be useful for you to understand how we think about recent events and their impact on our portfolio.

We are currently witnessing the greatest deleveraging event in history.  What began as a credit bubble bursting has now spread to the equity markets as banks, investment banks, hedge funds, structured products, mutual funds, pension funds, endowments and other leveraged and unleveraged market participants have been forced to liquidate assets by their counterparties, leverage providers, redeeming clients, and as a result of downgrades, other debts or other commitments that need to be funded.

These actions have led to forced and indiscriminate selling in security markets around the world, which in turn has caused other investors to panic or simply to sell, to get out of the way of other forced sellers.

As a fund which is generally substantially more long than short, we have also suffered large mark-to-market declines in our long investments.  Year to date, however, our performance has substantially exceeded that of the broader equity markets, which at this writing have seen a more than 34% decline.  Our outperformance is largely due to large gains on our investments in Longs Drugs and Wachovia Corporation as well as profits on our credit default swap and other short exposures.  Our market losses have been further mitigated because we operate unleveraged and have substantial cash balances.  Currently, we have cash and near-cash (Longs Drugs and Wachovia/Wells Fargo long/short) equal to approximately 39% of our capital.

When, you might ask, will the selling end?  While I don’t proclaim to be a market prognosticator, I will make a few observations.  Unlike the deleveraging that takes place when banks and other financial institutions sell assets to meet regulatory requirements, which is typically a longer term process, the forced deleveraging that is now taking place in the equity markets is being implemented largely by the prime brokerage firms and margin account managers at broker dealers around the world.  Prime brokers are not known to be laggardly in their approach to liquidating an account that no longer meets margin requirements.  This is likely to be even more true in the current environment.  As such, it may be reasonable to conclude that the forced liquidation that is now taking place may not be a prolonged process.

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The Education Resource Institute (TERI) in Chapter 11: First Marblehead (FMD) Expected Value

In Insurance, Security Analysis on April 7, 2008 at 9:08 pm

TERI is to student loan bonds as MBIA is to municipal bonds. By insuring payment to holders of such securities, guarantors make it cheaper for students and municipalities to borrow money. (If a third party promises to pay you in the event of borrower default, you feel more comfortable lending money; this translates into a lower required interest rate.) For a while, financial institutions have been unwilling to buy student loan bonds, and TERI’s bankruptcy will worsen this situation.

I have avoided loan originators in the current securitization “freeze.” While these businesses have demonstrated value far in excess of current market capitalizations, they will have lower revenue (and eventually no worth) if financial institutions refuse to buy securitized loans. Tom Brown and Mohnish Pabrai were rational in purchasing Accredited Home Lenders and Delta Financial, respectively (link to previous post). But the irrationality of financiers severely impaired these companies. A good investor familiar with loan originators’ business models should have anticipated this risk.

While FMD has positive expected value, there is a chance of substantial underperformance. It is not an attractive bet.

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SCOR Holdings Switzerland ADS (SCRJY): Arbitrage Opportunity

In Arbitrage, Insurance, Security Analysis on February 9, 2008 at 5:35 pm

On January 7, 2008 SCOR delisted its American depository shares from the NYSE. Shareholders will receive a cash payment equal to 2.75 Swiss Francs, 0.20 Euros and 25% a SCOR SE share. At current exchange rates, the workout value is $7.87, or 12.4% above SCRJY’s last trade price. In order to achieve this return risk-free, investors should establish currency hedges and a SCOR SE short position.

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Expected Value Among Bond Insurance Co. Investors Not Equal

In Insurance, Martin Whitman, Security Analysis on January 31, 2008 at 7:50 am

Sometimes the mathematical expectation of a stock varies for different purchasers. In the case of MBIA, an individual investor can lose much more than a portfolio manager ready to backstop a rights offering. (The former cannot lower his cost basis as much as the latter.) It is therefore manifestly stupid to purchase MBIA just because Martin Whitman has.

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Loss Reserves, Caprice & Insurance Company Valuation

In Insurance, Security Analysis on September 6, 2007 at 7:14 pm

Management can manipulate underwriting earnings by keeping loss reserves low. Earnings in the industry are calculated as earned premiums minus claims and claim expenses incurred as well as adjustments to prior years’ claims and claim expenses. So 2007 earnings can look excellent if management assumes lower losses for policies issued that year. If they are wrong, however, loss reserves will have to increase in 2008 or thereafter, and increases will be subtracted from earnings. This liability add-on is analogous to an asset writeoff in non-insurance companies.

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The Cost of Insurance Float

In Berkshire Hathaway, Insurance, Security Analysis, Warren Buffett on September 3, 2007 at 5:33 am

Combined ratios are the standard gauge of performance in the insurance industry. Yet the combined ratio relates only to underwriting profit and neglects income generated from the investment of premiums. Obviously short-tail insurers tend to have the most desirable combined ratios. If they don’t hold premiums long enough to make adequate investment income, they had better make an underwriting profit. It’s also obvious that a long-tail insurer, by having plenty of time to invest premiums, can compensate for mediocre underwriting with superior investment returns. In his 1996 annual letter, Warren Buffett cogitates over this point and proposes a useful gauge of performance:

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CRM Holdings (CRMH): Deep Value Opportunity

In Insurance on August 7, 2007 at 4:06 am

U P D A T E

As I wrote previously, several of CRM’s self-insured groups are under-reserved. Furthermore workers’ compensation rates have fallen to a point where self-insurance makes little sense compared to products offered by traditional carriers. CRM has a very tenuous business model.

The moral seems to be that statistical bargains are cheap for a reason—they are usually accompanied with poor qualitative factors.

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Unearned Premium Reserve & Associated Valuation Errors

In Benjamin Graham, Insurance, Security Analysis, Warren Buffett on August 6, 2007 at 6:49 am

Let’s say my annual car insurance premium with AIG is $2,000. On January 1, my entire payment goes on AIG’s balance sheet as an unearned premium liability, since coverage has not yet applied. (This is analogous to unearned revenue in non-insurance companies.) By July 1 this amount is reduced to $1,000, and by December 31 it is reduced to zero. Unearned premium thus becomes earned premium in a prorated fashion.

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Western Insurance Securities: Young Warren Buffett

In Insurance, Security Analysis, Warren Buffett on August 1, 2007 at 8:17 pm

In 2005, a group of students from the University of Kansas met with Warren Buffett. Their first question was whether he would still be able to earn investment returns of 50% annually. Buffett responded:

“Yes, I would still say the same thing today. In fact, we are still earning those types of returns on some of our smaller investments. The best decade was the 1950s; I was earning 50% plus returns with small amounts of capital. I could do the same thing today with smaller amounts. It would perhaps even be easier to make that much money in today’s environment because information is easier to access.

“You have to turn over a lot of rocks to find those little anomalies. You have to find the companies that are off the map - way off the map. You may find local companies that have nothing wrong with them at all. A company that I found, Western Insurance Securities, was trading for $3/share when it was earning $20/share! I tried to buy up as much of it as possible. No one will tell you about these businesses. You have to find them.”

Recently I was lucky enough to find an old article Buffett wrote about Western:

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